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I. INTRODUCTION
The decline in the prestige and influence of Israeli political parties,
particularly the larger parties, has become a source of distress for many
in Israel. Similarly, in the United States, where the significance of
parties is also recognized,' many have shown concern for weakening of
the dominant political parties In the U.S. system where politics are
ruled by two strong national parties, many fear possible damage to
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1. See LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN MOLD 9-39
(1986).
2. See Brian L. Porto, The Constitution and Political Parties: Supreme Court
Jurisprudence and Its Implications for Partybuilding, 8 CONST. COMM. 433 (1991).
smaller parties and independent candidates.' But, in Israel, the nature of
politics is becoming increasingly sectoral, personal, superficial and
populist.4 As is often characteristic of public discourse in Israel, many
hold the legal system responsible for this phenomenon.5
This Essay examines this contention by comparing Israeli and U.S.
law. On a more general level, this Essay considers the complex
relationships between the law of a given country and the style and
quality of its politics.
II. ISRAELI POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE LAW
The relationship between the Israeli legal system and Israeli political
parties can be characterized by two central phenomena.
First, the scope of the law pertaining to political parties is quite broad.
In Basic Law: The Knesset6 and Basic Law: The Government,7 both of
which form parts of the Israeli Constitution,' significant provisions have
been made with respect to political parties. 9
In comparison, the U.S. Constitution lacks reference to political
parties, which is a result of the Framers' hostility towards the very
notion of partisanship.' ° Their reasoning was based on the view that
strong parties would necessarily harm the separation-of-powers
structure." This reasoning is not applicable to the situation in Israel.
The separation between the Israeli executive branch and its legislative
branch is far more limited than its United States counterpart.2 In fact,
3. See William R. Kirschnrt, Note, Fusion, and the Associational Rights of Minor
Political Parties, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 683 (1995); Note, Fusion Candidacies,
Disaggregation, and Freedom of Association, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1302 (1996).
4. See ISRAEL AT THE POLLS 1996 (Daniel J. Elazar & Shmuel Sandier eds., 1998);
THE DEMISE OF PARTIES IN ISRAEL (Dani Korn. ed., 1998) (Hebrew).
5. For a comparison in the United States, see David Adamany, Political Finance
and the American Political Parties, 10 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 497, 513-515 (1983).
6. 12 L.S.I. 85 (1958) (available also at <http://www.mfa.gov.il>).
7. 1992 S.H. 214 (available in English translation at <http://www.mfa.gov.il>).
8. See C.A. (Civil Appeal) 6821/93, United Hamizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal,
49(4) P.D. (Supreme Court Judgments) 221. The Israeli Constitution, which is still
incomplete, is composed of 11 separate Basic Laws, enacted between 1958 and 1994.
For the constitutional status of the Basic Laws see Daphne Barak-Erez, From an
Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in American Perspective, 26
COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 309 (1995); Dalia Dorner, Does Israel Have a Constitution?,
43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1325 (1999).
9. For example, the right to submit list of candidates to the Israeli parliament has been
granted only to parties. See Basic Law: The Knesset, 12 L.S.I. 85 § 5A. The same
applies to the nomination of candidates for Prime Minister. See Basic Law: The
Government, 1992 S.H. 214 § 9; infra notes 30-32 and the relevant text.
10. See Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1479, 1484-521 (1994).
I1. See id.
12. Thus, for example, the Israeli Prime Minister and the majority of the Ministers
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Israeli judges and justices are chosen by a committee where only a
minority of its members are from the political arena. 3
In addition, two statutes specifically refer to Israeli political parties.
These are the Parties Law, 1992," a statute similar to that which is found
in few democratic states,'5 and the Political Parties (Financing) Law,
1973.6 Furthermore, a rich body of case law exists, including decisions
of the Israeli Supreme Court, which focus on issues related to political
parties. 7 A significant portion of this statutory and case law is recent.
Indeed, the increasing involvement of the law in matters of party politics
parallels another broader phenomenon, which reached prominence in
Israel during the early 1980's-the "legalization of government" and
even the "legalization of politics."'" The trend in Israel is to view
politics as law and to consider political questions as legal questions."
Political questions should be framed in terms of "What will work,"
have to be Parliament Members; and the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) may, by a
majority of its members, remove the Prime Minister from office, and call for new
elections for this position.
13. The committee that appoints judges is composed of the Chief Justice, two
Justices elected by the Supreme Court Justices, two members of the Bar elected by the
Bar Central Council, the Minister of Justice, another Minister elected by the
Government, and two Knesset Members elected by the Knesset. See Basic Law:
Judicature, 1984 S.H. 78, § 4(b) (also available in English translation at
<http://www.mfa.gov.il>). Five of the nine members of the committee (the Justices and
the representatives of the Bar) are not affiliated with political parties.
14. 1992 S.H. 190.
15. See CANDIDATE SELECTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE-THE SECRET
GARDEN OF POLITICS (Michael Gallagher & Michael Marsh eds., 1988); PARTY
ORGANIZATIONS-A DATA HANDBOOK (Richard S. Katz & Peter Mair eds., 1992);
WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND POLITICAL PARTIES (George E.
Delury ed., 2d ed. 1987); Aliza Bar, Legislation on Parties in Democratic States, in THE
PARTIES LAW IN ISRAEL: BETWEEN LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS 17
(Dan Avnon ed., 1993) (Hebrew).
16. 27 L.S.I. 48 (1972-1973) (also available in English translation at
<http://www.mfa.gov.il>).
17. For a review of the Israeli decisional law in this area, see Ariel Bendor, Case
Law of Parties in Israel, in THE PARTIES LAW IN ISRAEL: BETWEEN A LEGAL
FRAMEWORK AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS 63 (Dan Avnon ed., 1993) (Hebrew). For the
comparable situation in the United States, see Virginia E. Sloan, Comment, Judicial
Intervention in Political Party Disputes: The Political Thicket Reconsidered, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 622 (1975).
18. See AMNON RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
THE STATE OF ISRAEL 28-35 (5th ed. 1996) (Hebrew); Ariel L. Bendor, Are There Any
Limits to Justiciability?-The Jurisprudential and Constitutional Controversy in the
Light of the Israeli and American Experience, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 311 (1997).
19. See Ariel L. Bendor, Investigating the Executive Branch in Israel and in the
United States: Politics as Law, the Politics of Law, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 193 (2000).
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"What is right," or "Who possesses the political clout?" However, these
questions have unfortunately become transformed into "What is legal,"
and sometimes even in narrower institutional terms, such as, "What will
withstand judicial scrutiny?"
Second, the point of departure regarding the legal arrangements of
Israeli political parties is that a party is considered to constitute a "legal
unit." Whereas, in the past, the tendency was to view parties first and
foremost as voluntary associations, similar to the various bodies
operating within private law.2" Today, the trend is to emphasize the
parties' public-political status.2 Parties have come close to being
considered state authorities and treated as such.22 This change may be
attributed to the fact that parties are no longer considered, as they were
until recent years, as voluntary non-profit associations, governed by the
laws of such associations.23 Instead, they are organized in conformance
with a special statute-the Parties Law24-whose provisions are geared
to their public character and their constitutional function. 5
Similarly, in the Unites States, a central issue of party law debates
whether political parties are public or private bodies.26 While private
bodies are entitled to constitutional rights, public bodies are primarily
obliged to respect the constitutional rights of others. 27  Thus, the
response of U.S. law to this dilemma is ambiguous. It seems, that the
U.S. major parties simultaneously hold some of the rights usually
accorded to individuals, including the rights addressed in the First
Amendment, alongside some of the duties of governmental authorities.28
In particular, these are duties that stem from the role of the U.S. major
parties in nominating the candidates in both state and federal elections.2 9
What are the consequences of the two phenomena upon the status of
parties in Israel? The answer to this question is somewhat complex.
20. For example, political parties were incorporated under the private associations
laws, and were governed by contract laws. See I.H. Klinghoffer, The Legal Framework
of Political Parties in Israel, in URY YADIN BOOK 199 (Aharon Barak & Tana Spanitz
eds., vol. 111990) (Hebrew).
21. See id.
22. See C.A.P. (Civil Appeal Permission) 7504/95, Yassin v. The Parties Registrar,
50(2) P.D. 45, 61.
23. See Parties Law, 1992, S.H. 190 § 29.
24. See id.
25. See Rhanan Har-Zahav, The Parties Act-A New Reality, 2 HAMISHPAT 33
(1994) (Hebrew).
26. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1118 (2d ed.
1988).
27. See id. at 1688.
28. See Daniel Hayes Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties:
A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741 (1993).
29. See id.
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III. ISRAELI LAW STRENGTHENS THE STATUS OF THE
POLITICAL PARTIES
From a certain standpoint, the new legal arrangements and the
investing of political parties with constitutional functions has
strengthened the position of the parties in Israel. First, as of the last
parliamentary elections, the right to submit lists of candidates to the
Israeli parliament (the Knesset) has been granted only to parties.30 The
same applies to the nomination of candidates for Prime Minister,31 who
under normal circumstances is usually required to be listed as first on his
party's list for election to the Knesset. Thus, the candidate for Prime
Minister must usually be the head of a political party.32
In contrast, in the United States, there is no formal legal requirement
that candidates at either the state or the federal level belong to a political
party.33 And, despite Israel's multi-party system, the party-alignment
requirement does not hinder the right to run for office. Ironically, in the
United States, where there is no apparent formal prevention of
independent candidates competition, the odds of such candidates being
elected are highly unlikely, due to the majoritarian non-proportional
method of elections.34
Furthermore, in Israel only parties possess the right to receive public
funds to finance their political activities. 3' This right does not exist in
the United States. 36 These arrangements encourage the concentration of
significant political activities in the hands of the political parties in
Israel. As long as such arrangements exist-and only the Knesset,
30. See Basic Law: The Knesset, 12 L.S.I. 85 § 5A.
31. See Basic Law: The Government, 1992 S.H. 214 § 9.
32. See id. § 8(a)(2). Any change in the procedures regarding the nomination for
Prime Minister requires an absolute majority of 61 or more of the Knesset's 120
members. See id § 56.
33. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 886-94
(Sthed. 1995).
34. It is interesting to note here, that in Israel, candidates and lists that are not
affiliated with any party per se are permitted to participate in local elections. In many
cases, the larger political parties do not partake in local elections with candidates of their
own. Instead, they support local "independent" candidates. For a similar phenomenon
in the States see Nancy Northrup, Note, Local Nonpartisan Elections, Political Parties
and the First Amendment, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1677 (1987).
35. See Political Parties (Financing) Law, 1973, 27 L.S.I. 48 (1972-1973) §§ 1-2.
36. For example, in the States all the politicians are independent, and are supported
by people who may identify with their parties. Furthermore, candidates have to raise the
majority of their campaign funds by themselves. See Political Parties (Financing) Law,
1973, 27 L.S.I. 48 § 1.
whose members are all delegates of political parties, is authorized to
repeal them37-the continued existence of parties is guaranteed. For this
reason, great significance has been ascribed to the aforementioned
phenomenon of the weakening of the power and status of the parties, and
especially the weakening of the larger parties in Israeli politics and
governance. Israel's laws ensure the position of the parties as a
cornerstone of government.38 Even under the new system of direct
personal election of the Prime Minister, success depends on attaining
political power within a political party, and thus requires the existence of
the party.39
Secondly, the Parties Law does not involve itself in the internal
governance of parties or in the way they manage themselves. It is
sufficient that the party possesses a charter which establishes its basic
structural arrangements, such as who may join the party and the manner
in which Knesset candidates are selected.40 The Law does not demand
that the internal structure of the party be democratic in nature.
The method of internal governance of parties differs markedly in the
U.S. system, where regulation of primaries for candidate selection
exists.4 ' This discrepancy between the United States and Israeli systems
can be attributed to the different methods of election in each country. In
the Israeli multi-party system there are, among others, parties comprised
of immigrants from certain countries, minority parties, and ultra-
orthodox religious parties (whose leaders are chosen by spiritual
religious leaders)." Hence, in Israel it is impossible to force a system of
regulated primaries with the general right of participation regardless of
race, religion, and so on.45  The representative aspect of the elected
authorities in Israel, which at times lends itself to sectoral, and even
over-sectoral,46 representation is a byproduct of the election method
37. Only the Knesset, that enacted the Parties Financing Act, may amend it.
38. See H.C.J. (High Court of Justice) 1601/90, Shalit v. Peres, 44(3) P.D. 353,
363; RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 18, at 565.
39. See Basic Law: The Government, 1992 S.H. 214 § 8(a), together with Basic
Law: The Knesset, 12 L.S.I. 85 (1958) § 5A.
40. See id. §§ 4 and 14.
41. See TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1118-29.
42. Among them are "Israel Ba'aliya" and "Israel Beitenu", which mainly
represent immigrants from Russia.
43. Among them are the United Arab List and B.L.D., which represent mainly
Arab citizens.
44. Among them are "Shas" and the United Thora Judaism Party.
45. For example, there are two ultra-orthodox central parties: one ("Shas")
represents ultra-orthodox Jews of Asian and African origin ("Sfaradim"); and the other
party (the United Thora Judaism Party) represents ultra-orthodox Jews of European
origin ("Ashkenazim").
46. See Leon D. Epstein, Will American Political Parties Be Privatized?, 5 J. L. &
POL. 239 (1989); Games S. Fay, The Legal Regulation of Political Parties, 9 J. LEGIS.
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itself. In contrast, the two-party system in the United States requires
regulation of candidate selection, to ensure that the composition of
elected state and national authorities will not be directed by
discrimination or unjust partisan election methods. Still, as a result of
claims that over-regulation harms constitutional party rights, some
commentators discuss a "privatization" trend in parties 48 especially
through judicial invalidation of laws which harm these rights.
The Israeli Parties Law does not establish procedures whereby the
party charter may be enforced.49 However, members of the party can
seek recourse in the courts for enforcement of their rights under party
charters-just as they were able to prior to the enactment of the Parties
Law.5 °
Third, despite the traditional image of the Israeli courts, and the Israeli
High Court of Justice in particular, as judicially active in political
matters, the courts grant political parties a considerable degree of
autonomy and freedom to handle their affairs.5 ' The reasons underlying
this attitude were expressed by Justice Barak:
A political party and a parliamentary faction are "legal units.". . . They possess
a statutory status .... Every statutory structure must grant them a wide field of
maneuverability. Government authorities need not interfere in their activities.
This is a two-pronged proposition. First, from the viewpoint of the law
applying to the validity of the actions of the party or faction, it is necessary to
accord the parties a broad scope of maneuverability. "Non-interference" on the
part of the government-including the courts-is not based here on a restraint
in applying an authority to review, but on the legality of the actions, which is
itself based on the freedom of action of the parties and factions who represent
the will of the people in our democratic state .... Second, from the viewpoint
of the extent of judicial review, such review must be limited, in recognition that
it is possible that there can be actions that will be illegal (under public law)
which are nevertheless not subject to judicial review.
52
263 (1982).
47. These rights include freedom of association and the party's right to protect
privacy of its membership, where members' affiliation with organization might subject
them to public hostility or discrimination. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of
Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
48. See Epstein, supra note 46; Fay, supra note 46.
49. See Bendor, Case Law of Parties in Israel, supra note 17, at 71.
50. See RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 18, at 587, n.4.
51. See C.A. 642/86, Veinberg v. The National Religious Party, 43(2) P.D. 43;
C.A. 2219/92, Shapira-Libai v. The Israeli Labor Party, 46(4) P.D. 221.
52. H.C. 5364/94, Valner v. Chairman of the Israeli Labor Party, 49(1) P.D. 758,
802-03.
It should be clarified, that the second meaning noted by Justice Barak
signifies that even in circumstances where the action of a political party
may be illegal, the courts may refrain from interfering due to the special
constitutional status of the parties' political activities.
On the basis of this approach, the Supreme Court refused to interfere
with a decision by the Labor Party's internal adjudicatory body,53 which
permitted the participation in the Knesset primaries by a party activist
convicted of theft and of taking bribes." This occurred despite the fact
that the Party's charter prohibited the candidacy in the primaries of
anyone convicted of a "shameful crime," and that the Supreme Court
had already found that the crimes committed by the party activist had
been such crimes. In another case, the Supreme Court declined to
invalidate a coalition agreement between the Labor and Shas parties,
although the agreement constituted "a pre-determined decision to run
roughshod over proper legal procedures ... a decision that was wholly
unworthy."56
Furthermore, in a line of decisions, the Supreme Court has chosen to
construe in a "precise, narrow and circumscribed ' 7 manner those
provisions of Basic Law: The Knesset58 and the Parties Law59 that permit
the invalidation of those parties and lists of candidates for the Knesset
which oppose the existence of Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state
or which engage in racial incitement 0 Thus, the Court has established
that a party will be disqualified only if: (1) the improper aims of the
party, i.e. deprivation of Israel's existence as a Jewish and democratic
state or incitement to racism, constitute a central and overriding goal of
the party; (2) the party is acting to achieve that goal; and (3) there is
clear and convincing evidence of this.6'
53. A couple of Israeli parties, including the greater parties, have internal tribunals.
These tribunals, which derive their authority from the party's internal regulations, decide
legal disputes between party members and institutions. The legal status of such tribunals
is that of arbitration.
54. See C.A. 2211/96, Cohen v. Cohen, 50(1) P.D. 629.
55. See Cr.A. (Criminal Appeal) 419/92, State of Israel v. Cohen, 47(3) P.D. 821.
56. Valner, 49(3) P.D. at 778 (Opinion of Chief Justice Shamgar) (emphasis in the
original).
57. E.A. (Elections Appeal) 1/88, Neiman v. Chairman of the Elections to the
Twelve Knesset Central Board, 42(4) P.D. 177, 187.
58. See Basic Law: The Knesset, 12 L.S.I. 85 § 7(a).
59. See Parties Law, 1992, S.H. 190 § 5.
60. Two parties were disqualified of participating in Knesset elections. One of
them-the Socialists List-was disqualified due to its objection to Israel's existence.
See E.A. 1/65 Yardor v. Chairman of Elections to the Sixth Knesset Central Board, 19(3)
P.D. 369. The other-"Kach" list-was disqualified due to its objection to democracy
and its sedition for racism against Arab citizens. See Neiman, 42(4) P.D. 177.
61. See Neiman, 42(4) P.D. 177; E.A. 2/88, Ben Shalom v. Chairman of Elections
to the Twelve Knesset Central Board, 43(4) P.D. 221; C.A.P. (Civil Appeal Permission)
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IV. ISRAELI LAW DIMINISHES THE STATUS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES
It seems that alongside the above-noted contributions of Israeli law to
enhancing party status, there are arrangements under the law that have
the opposite effect. There is a diminishment of the parties and an
encouragement of political activities outside the framework of the
parties.62  Thus, even in circumstances where the court declines to
interfere in party decisions or actions, the very existence of the legal
proceedings, or even the possibility of such proceedings, operates as a
certain infringement upon the organizational freedom of the party.63
This infringement becomes particularly blatant in those cases where the
public character and constitutional status of parties causes them to be
treated in a stricter manner than would be the case with ordinary
voluntary associations. The following exemplifies this.
First, political parties' special constitutional status is not expressed
solely in the privilege of a more restrained governmental or judicial
involvement in their affairs, but also in obligations and restrictions that
derive the fundamental principles of public law.64 Thus, political parties
may be required to operate in accordance with the principles of equality,
good faith, and reasonability, which do not apply to private bodies,
despite the fact that, as previously noted, Israeli parties are not required
to structure their internal governance on a democratic basis.65
Second, the legislature and the courts in Israel have imposed extensive
restrictions on the financial activities of parties.66 The purpose of these
restrictions is the prevention of an intermingling of financial
considerations with the political activities,67 a combination that has been
seen as liable to lead to a deterioration in ethical standards.6" In the
words of Chief Justice Shamgar, in such a combination "there is ... an
interposition of the granting of financial favors into the area of political
relationships, the corruptive nature of which is clearly apparent. '9
Therefore, the prohibition against party engagement in financial business
7504/95, Yassin v. The Parties Registrar, 50(2) P.D. 45.
62. See Gad Barzilai, The Decline of Parties and the Legal System, in THE DEMISE
OF PARTIES IN ISRAEL 116 (Dani Korn ed., 1998) (Hebrew).
63. See Bendor, Investigating the Executive Branch, supra note 19.
64. See RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 18, at 570-71.
65. See supra text accompanying note 40 and 41.
66. See Political Parties (Financing) Law, 1973, 27 L.S.I. 48 (1972-1973).
67. See H.C.H. 1523/90, Levi v. Prime Minister, 44(2) P.D. 213, 215.
68. See id.
69. Id.
transactions accompanies the funding of the parties. 0 The Israeli courts
and legislature also restrict their sources of income-including, inter
alia, a prohibition on accepting corporate contributions7 -and
restrictions on the nature of their campaign expenditures. 2 Parties are
permitted to accept loans only from banks 3 Subject to the oversight of
the State Comptroller,74 parties are required to issue an annual report on
the extent of their assets and liabilities."5 Even the financing of the
campaign expenditures in the primaries are regulated and restricted by
an extensive series of statutory provisions. 6 The violation of these
regulations constitutes a criminal offense.77  The Israeli courts have
invalidated financial provisions contained in political agreements
between parties.
Similarly, in the United States, there is widespread regulation of the
financial aspects and funding of parties' activities79 to such an extent that
some claim that the regulation conflicts with the parties' First
Amendment rights." Still it appears as though the limitations in Israel• 81
are stricter. Perhaps this stems not only from the greater U.S.
economic capability, but also from the fact that the ethos of economic
equality still plays a role in Israeli culture, coupled with the fear that the
possibility to be elected will not be available to those with lesser
resources.
82
Third, the very registration of a political party in Israel, and its
resulting activities, require the fulfillment of extensive procedural
70. See Parties Law, 1992, S.H. 190 § 21.
71. See id. § 25; Political Parties (Financing) Law, 1973, 27 L.S.I. 48 § 8.
72. See id. § 7.
73. See Parties Law, 1992, S.H. 190 § 7(a).
74. See id. § 13(b); see also Political Parties (Financing) Law, 1973, 27 L.S.I. 48
§10.
75. See id. § 25(a).
76. See Parties Law, 1992, S.H. 190 Chapter II.
77. See id. § 28; Political Parties (Financing) Law, 1973, 27 L.S.I. 48, § 9(t).
78. See, e.g., H.C.H. 1523/90, Levi v. Prime Minister, 44(2) P.D. 213; H.C.H.
1635/90, Jerjevski v. Prime Minister, 45(1) P.D. 749.
79. See Adamany, supra note 5.
80. See Rick J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws:
Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53 (1987); Clarisa Long,
Note, Shouting Down the Voice of the People: Political Parties, Powerful PACs, and
Concerns about Corruption, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1994).
81. Thus, for example, it is forbidden for an Israeli party to receive any
contribution from an individual that exceeds $400 per year. See Political Parties
(Financing) Law, 1973, 27 L.S.I. 48 (1972-73) § 8. However, in the United States, a
lawful contribution to a party cannot exceed $25,000. See Federal Election Campaign
Act, 2 U.S.C. § 41 la(a)(3) (1994). In the case of a contribution to a candidate with
respect to any election for Federal Office, the amount cannot exceed $1,000. See
2 U.S.C. § 441a(1)(A) (1994).
82. See RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 18, at 594.
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requirements. The party has to be established by at least one hundred
founders.83 The party must submit a detailed charter and maintain a
number of institutions.4 Non-compliance with these conditions may
prevent registration or subject the party to litigation in the courts. This
significantly complicates the organizing of a party and its operations.
V. THE OVERALL PICTURE
The resulting picture of the status of Israeli and U.S. parties is a
complicated one. The impact of the law upon Israeli and U.S. party
status is neither one-sided nor one-dimensional. On the one hand, the
Israeli law assures the existence of parties-in that the law grants parties
basic constitutional functions in determining legislative membership and
the Chief Executive and in that the law funds parties through the public
treasury. Israeli law further grants parties significant, if not total
freedom, in establishing the content of their substantive political actions.
United States law-in all that regards the two major parties-reaches
similar results by different methods. The law ensures the strife and
survival of the major parties by granting them a status similar to the
status of governmental authorities.
On the other hand, the laws in both Israel and the United States place
more than minimal administrative burdens on the parties. They impose
financial restrictions upon them and submit them to judicial review,
which obligates them to fulfill a meaningful measure of openness and
disclosure of their activity to public scrutiny.
Yet, while the picture may be complex, it is not internally
inconsistent. It is a result of the basic constitutional functions fulfilled
by the parties. Both Israel and the United States subsidize and grant
substantial freedom to political parties which requires-at least from
Israel's political and sociocultural standpoint-significant administrative
obligations and specified judicial and administrative organs of oversight.
Despite the fact that political parties are voluntary associations, they are
subject to similar rules applicable to government bodies, namely the
possession of powers, which are subject to assurances of fair
proceedings and to appropriate review of their actions.
Indeed, it is possible that criticism over this phenomenon in Israel is
only part of the broader phenomenon of the legalization of Israeli
83. See Parties Law, 1992, S.H. 190 § 2.
84. See id. §§ 4-14.
politics. Thus, it is not simply that over-extensive legal regulation may
unnecessarily hamper the democratic political process. In the view of
Israeli public officials in particular, and the public as a whole, such
regulation may further create a commonality between fulfillment of the
minimal requirements of the law and public and political propriety-
very different standards altogether. By meeting its legal duties, a party
in Israel is considered by the public to have fulfilled its social duties and
obligations.
Nonetheless, it seems as though there is no way to avoid the ever-
present involvement of the law in Israeli party politics. The Israeli
experience demonstrates that in the absence of enforceable legal
boundaries, political parties will not freely take upon themselves even
the most elementary limitations imposed by the law today.
This phenomenon, which exists in Israeli political and social culture,
is not thus expressed in the United States. Perhaps this is an explanation
for the fact, that internal politics of parties is not on the agenda of U.S.
courts to the extent that it is on the agenda of their Israeli counterparts.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to blame the law for the current decline in the prestige of
the political parties in Israel. The law assures the position of parties in
the political structure85 and endows them with essential constitutional
functions. The modest and insufficient oversight of the law and the
courts over party operations is designed to assure that at least some
propriety be demanded from bodies that hold central public functions
and are funded from out of the public treasury. There is no avoiding
such oversight in Israel. The impression that the judicial and legal
bounds placed on the parties may substantively narrow their political
activities and operations is baseless. It is possible that this mistaken
notion has contributed to the weakening of Israel's larger political
parties. For those who appreciate the importance of political parties and
for those who entertain fears that political parties will diminish in
influence, it is especially important that the above misperception be
corrected.
85. In spite of this fact, some Israeli commentators fear a decline of parties due to
the fact that parties lost gradually their traditional functions and influence for the sake of
the interest groups and the media. As a result, structural conflicts and split of the public
policy are likely to grow. This may cause instability in the political system. See Moshe
Lissak, Decline of Parties and Sectoral Rise, in THE DEMISE OF PARTIES IN ISRAEL 129
(Dany Kom ed., 1998) (Hebrew).
